Digital Nudging in Optimal Stopping Games: Adversarial Interactions in Layered Choice Architecture
Digital Nudge Effects in Optimal Stopping Games: Antagonistic Interactions in Layered Choice Architectures
A 2^3 between-subjects factorial experiment (N=181) based on the secretary problem examines the individual and combined effects of three types of digital nudges—anchoring, salience, and social proof—on stopping behavior and outcome quality in sequential decision-making tasks. The study finds that anchoring nudges significantly increase exploration (b=1.207, p=.017), salience nudges have the smallest effect, and the combination of anchoring and social proof nudges yields the worst outcome quality ($181.83 vs. $192.21 for anchoring alone), with outcome quality monotonically decreasing as the number of nudges increases.
Source:arXiv q-fin · arxiv.org